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NOTES
THE OPEN RANGE: A VANISHING CONCEPT
One of the oldest problems known to the landowner has involved the
trespass of animals upon the land, and the erection of fences to prevent the
trespass. Ancient English law made the landowner strictly responsible
for trespass by his livestock: "Where my beasts, of their own wrong, without
my will and knowledge, break another's close, I shall be punished, for I
am the trespasser with my beasts."' It is safe to say that, next to problems
arising in connection with schools and with water, the fencing problem,
and trespass related to it, remains to this day of paramount importance to
rural residents of Wyoming. As grazing conditions in the state have
changed, legal concepts of grazing privileges have also changed.
It was settled at common law that it was the duty of the owner of
animals to fence them in, and that no duty rested upon their neighbors
to fence them out; the owner of animals was liable for their trespass upon
the lands of another, whether the lands trespassed upon were enclosed or
not.2 This common law rule has never been accepted in Wyoming. In
i.
2.

12 Hen. VII, Keilway 36.
Martin v. Platte Valley Sheep Co., 12 Wyo. 432, 76 Pac. 571 (1904).
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Martin v. Platte Valley Sheep Co.,3 the Wyoming Supreme Court indicated
that the common law rule requiring the owner of cattle to confine them,
"never obtained" in Wyoming or in other western states. In numerous
other decisions the Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized the principle
that no trespass is committed when animals lawfully running at large
4
wander upon the unenclosed lands of a private owner.
The importance of standards to define whether land was enclosed or
unenclosed was of such concern that the Legislature of the Wyoming
Territory in 1876, in one of its few enactments, set forth the requirements
for a lawful fence. Although the statute did not specifically say so, the
inference was that if a fence did not conform to the specifications, the land
was considered unenclosed and the owner had no remedy for trespass. The
law applied only in Albany, Carbon, and Uinta Counties and provided
only for fences made of poles and boards, "five to the panel, the top rail
or pole to be at least five feet from the surface of the ground." 5
With changes in fencing materials-principally the advent of barbed
wire-the original requirements for a lawful fence have been, by necessity,
frequently changed by our legislature. The last of these changes was in
the 1953 session when a comprehensive definition of a lawful fence was
enacted. In addition to exact specifications regarding materials, spacing,
and height of wire or poles, the law now provides that any fence better
6
than the one described shall be a lawful fence.
Although the "fence out" rule prevails in this state, it should be noted
that there are exceptions to it of great importance to Wyoming residents.
The principal exception is that involving federal lands. Since these lands,
comprising more than 51% of our surface area, are not subject to Wyoming
law, the law regarding fencing and trespass on them should be reviewed
with care.
In one of the earliest fence cases, the United States Supreme Court held
that a Colorado rancher, who turned his stock loose some distance from a
national forest boundary, was rightfully enjoined by local forest officials
from so doing. The Court indicated that it appeared that the defendant
had turned out his cattle under circumstances which showed that he
expected and intended that they would go upon the reserve to graze. It
also held that fence laws do not authorize wanton and willful trespass, nor
do they afford immunity to those who, in disregard of property rights, turn
loose their cattle under circumstances showing that they intend to graze
upon the lands of another. 7 The Court went on to say that since it had
decided that point, it was not necessary to consider how far the United
States was required to go in fencing its property.
3.
4.

Id. at 450, 76 Pac. at 574.
Garreston v. Avery, 26 Wyo. 53, 176 Pac. 433 (1918); Painter v. Stahley, 15 Wyo.
510 (1907); Hardman v. Kine, 14 Wyo. 503 (1906); Cosgriff v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190

5.
6.
7.

Compiled Laws c. 51 (1876).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 66-501 (Supp. 1957).
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 31 S.Ct. 485, 55 L.Ed. 570 (1911).

(1901).
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In a Montana case decided in 1908 a federal circuit court was more
explicit in regard to fencing. It said that the United States had the unlimited right to control the occupation of the public lands, and that no
obligation to fence those lands, or to join with others in fencing them for
the purpose of protecting its rights, could be imposed on it by a state.8
In conformity with this ruling the Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management have drawn up regulations prohibiting unlicensed livestock from grazing on lands under the control of these agencies, and have
provided impoundment and damage procedures against the owners of livestock trespassing thereon. 9
Wyoming law provides that an owner of land may require the owner
of adjacent land to pay one-half the cost of construction of a partition
fence. 10 It also provides that joint users of a partition fence should share the
cost of maintenance in proportion to their respective interests. In case
either construction or maintenance costs are refused, a civil action may be
maintained to recover the share of the landowner not participating.
In West Virginia, the state fencing laws are similar to those of Wyoming
and provide for joint contribution of adjacent landowners." However, in
a case tried there in 1941 in federal court, the government was granted an
injunction against a landowner whose livestock had grazed on the national
forest adjoining his property. The defendant landowner said he was willing
to build half the fence as West Virginia law provided, if the government
would build the other half. The court, in ruling against the proposal, said
that there was no law passed by Congress requiring the government to
fence lands that it owns. It further stated that the plaintiff (the government) was a sovereign and had a right to make its own rules, and however
hard and unjust it might seem to the citizens owning lands adjoining those
12
of the government, they must comply with those rules and regulations.
Another exception (in addition to the one respecting federal lands)
seems to be developing in the western states as to unfenced private lands.
In Haskins v. Andrews, 13 decided in 1904, the Wyoming Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant, who had turned out more cattle upon his own
land than the land could reasonably support, could not be held liable for
damage caused by his cattle wandering upon and depasturing the plaintiff's
unenclosed premises. The court went on to say that it did not decide
whether the fact that the defendant had overstocked his own land might
or might not, in connection with other acts and circumstances, tend to show
a willful trespass. Later rulings in Montana and New Mexico are more
decisive. The Montana case' 4 held that where one stocked his own land
with a greater number of horses than it could support, so that in order
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Shannon v. United States, 160 Fed. 870 (9th Cir. 1908).
36 C.F.R. 261.13 (1919); 43 C.F.R. 161.11 (1) (Supp. 1956).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. §66-507 (1945).
West Virginia Code 2118 (1955).
United States v. Johnston, 38 F.Supp. 4 (S.D.W.Va., 1941).
12 Wyo. 458, 76 Pac. 588 (1904).
Hill v. Chappel Bros. of Montana, 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106
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to sustain life the horses were forced to pasture on the lands of others, the
duty to make compensation to the persons wronged was as clear as it would
be if the horses were driven thereon in the first instance. The circumstances and decision of the New Mexico case, in 1935, are interesting, as they
further illustrate that overstocking may evidence willful trespass and
liability. The plaintiff had a fence surrounding about fifteen sections of
grazing land. Within the enclosure (and not fenced) were two sections of
state land leased to the defendant for grazing purposes. Onto these two
sections the defendant turned some 200 head of cattle. The New Mexico
Supreme Court sustained an injunction permanently enjoining the defendant from permitting cattle to go upon lands owned by the plaintiff.
The court stated that there was not sufficient grass on the defendant's
lands for the number of cattle put to graze, and held that relief against
willful trespass is not dependent upon the existence of a statutory fence. 15
As the West has become more settled there has been a tendency to
provide stricter control over livestock running at large. An example of
this is the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1951, in which the
court held that the owner of cattle which wandered into the City of
Laramie was liable for damages to unfenced hay destroyed by them, in
view of a city ordinance prohibiting cattle from wandering at large.' 6
Further evidence of the passing of the open range theory and toward
a return to the old common law doctrine is found in the enactment in 1955
by the Wyoming State Legislature of a Livestock District law.' 7 This
provides that landowners within an organized irrigation district may
petition the county commissioners of the county wherein the proposed
district would lie, and if 75% of the landowners owning 75% of the land
are favorable, the commissioners can create a livestock district. Within this
district, the owner of livestock is guilty of a misdemeanor if he allows
livestock to run at large. The owner is also civilly liable to any person
within the district "who shall suffer damage from the depredations or trespass of such animals, without regard to the condition of his fence."
The evolution of the fence law depicts the history of our state. In the
early days there were areas of open range and cattle wandered miles from
home, subject only to the control of the round-up wagon and a few riders.
The homesteader coming later if he wanted to keep animals out, had to
fence against them. Then came the creation of the National Forests and
a restriction of grazing on federal lands. In 1933, with the passage of the
Taylor Grazing Act, the last of the real "open range" disappeared. Later,
the development of intensively farmed areas, due to irrigation, brought
about further changes. Cities and towns have expanded and by ordinances
have moved to protect their citizens. The legislature and the courts have
kept abreast of the changing times and we now definitely tend toward the
"fence in" concept of the old common law.
FRANK C. MOCKLER
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Wright v. Atkinson, 39 N.M. 307, 46 P.2d 667 (1935).
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